JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL VERSUS JUSTICE DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD

National Affairs

October 28, 2026

JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL VERSUS JUSTICE DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD

[A Critical Note on Judicial Independence and the Collegium-System] by Prof. (Dr.) M. Afzal Wani 

I-Introduction

The reported differences between former Supreme Court judges Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud raise fundamental questions about judicial independence, constitutional morality and the appointment of judges in India. The controversy gained renewed attention in October 2026 following reports about Justice Kaul’s memoir, Without Fear or Favour. Justice Kaul criticised what he perceived as Justice Chandrachud’s excessive accommodation of the Union Government in judicial appointments. Justice Chandrachud, however, described their Collegiums’ meetings as respectful and characterised their professional relationship as cordial. 
 
The issue should not be understood merely as a personal disagreement between two distinguished judges. It reflects a deeper constitutional debate concerning the relationship between the judiciary and the executive.
 
II-Judicial Independence and Executive Influence
 
The principal criticism attributed to Justice Kaul concerns the practice of seeking the Government’s position on proposed judicial appointments before the Collegium has formally deliberated. He distinguishes legitimate consultation with the executive from obtaining what he describes as pre-approval.
 
This distinction is constitutionally significant. Judicial independence requires judges to remain free from political pressure, particularly when deciding disputes involving the Government itself. If executive preferences influence the selection of judges, public confidence in judicial impartiality may be weakened.
 
Justice Kaul’s position, therefore, emphasises institutional firmness. The judiciary must engage with the executive where necessary, but such engagement should not compromise its constitutional autonomy. Nevertheless, allegations about particular interactions must be treated as one judge’s account rather than conclusive proof of institutional misconduct.
 
III-Independence versus Accountability
 
The controversy exposes the structural weaknesses of India’s Collegium system. Under the judicial appointments framework developed through the Second and Third Judges Cases, the judiciary exercises primacy in recommending appointments to the higher judiciary.
 
In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court invalidated the constitutional amendments and legislation establishing the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The majority considered the proposed arrangement incompatible with judicial independence.
 
Justice Kaul’s reported reflections nevertheless question whether rejecting the NJAC without giving it an opportunity to function was necessarily the best institutional choice. 
 
The central difficulty is that judicial independence does not automatically guarantee transparency or accountability. The Collegium may protect appointments from direct political control, yet its deliberations can remain insufficiently transparent. Decisions based on undisclosed considerations, personal impressions or unexplained preferences risk undermining public confidence. Consequently, neither unchecked executive influence nor an opaque judicial monopoly provides a satisfactory solution. A credible appointments process must combine independence, merit, diversity, transparency and institutional accountability.
 
IV-Inclusion of Underprivileged and Minorities
 
Another significant issue concerns the reported Government queries about the representation of religious minorities and the caste background of a judicial candidate’s family before conversion. Justice Kaul reportedly regarded these questions as objectionable and potentially irrelevant to assessing judicial suitability. 
 
This episode raises important questions under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which embody equality before the law and equality of opportunity in public employment, respectively. Although judicial appointments operate through a distinct constitutional framework, equality and non-discrimination remain essential constitutional values.
 
Diversity in the judiciary is important because courts serve a pluralistic society. However, diversity should not become a substitute for professional competence, integrity and independence. Equally, merit must not become an undefined formula concealing prejudice or exclusion. A fair appointments process must evaluate candidates through relevant, consistent and defensible criteria.
 
V- Assessment and Conclusion
 
Justice Kaul’s criticism deserves serious consideration because judicial independence requires resistance to inappropriate executive pressure. His insistence on distinguishing consultation from pre-approval identifies a genuine institutional concern.
 
However, a critical assessment must also recognise that the Chief Justice has administrative responsibilities and must manage the relationship between constitutional institutions. Consultation with the Government is not inherently objectionable; the decisive question is whether it influences judicial recommendations improperly.
 
Justice Chandrachud’s reported response must also be considered. He stated that he could not comment fully without reading the memoir and described the Collegium meetings as respectful, involving reasoned dialogue.
 
Furthermore, Justice Kaul’s own account invites scrutiny of the Collegium system beyond his disagreements with the former Chief Justice. If the system suffers from opacity, personal preferences and inconsistent standards, reform must address those deficiencies comprehensively rather than attribute them exclusively to one individual.
 
The reported differences between Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud illuminate a fundamental constitutional dilemma: how can India preserve judicial independence while ensuring transparency and accountability in judicial appointments?
 
The answer lies neither in unquestioning judicial supremacy nor in executive control. It requires clear appointment criteria, reasoned institutional deliberation, safeguards against political interference and meaningful public accountability consistent with judicial independence.
 
Ultimately, the credibility of the Supreme Court depends not merely on the personal integrity of individual judges but also on the strength of the institutions they serve. The controversy is therefore best understood as an opportunity to critically examine and reform India’s judicial appointments system.
 
(The writer is Chairman, Institute of Objective Studies)
 
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